We study the determinants of vertical integration in a new dataset of over 750,000 firms from 93 countries. Existing evidence suggests the presence of large cross-country differences in the organization of firms, which may be related to differences in financial development, contracting costs or regulation. We find cross-country correlations between vertical integration on the one hand and financial development, contracting costs, and entry barriers on the other that are consistent with these "priors". Nevertheless, we also show that these correlations are almost entirely driven by industrial composition; countries with more limited financial development, higher contracting costs or greater entry barriers are concentrated in industries with a high propensity for vertical integration.
Introduction
Casual empiricism suggests the presence of signi…cant di¤erences in the organization of production across countries. For example, …rms are often thought to be larger and more vertically integrated in less developed countries. Palepu (1997, 2000) provide evidence consistent with this view and suggest that this is because market and contractual relationships are more costly in less-developed countries. Nevertheless, there has not been a systematic analysis of cross-country di¤erences in vertical integration and their causes. Our primary aim in this paper is to make a …rst attempt at such a systematic analysis and to investigate the relationship between various institutional characteristics and vertical integration across countries.
Three well-established theories o¤er predictions on how di¤erences in (speci…c) institutional characteristics of countries should a¤ect vertical integration. First, according to the highly in ‡uential Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory pioneered by Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , the internal organization of a …rm is designed to improve incentives and limit agency costs. Vertical integration is perhaps the best known application of this theory. Vertical integration encourages speci…c investments and reduces holdup problems when markets are imperfect. 1 According to TCE, vertical integration should therefore be more prevalent when it is harder to write long-term contracts between upstream and downstream …rms.
A second body of work emphasizes the importance of contracts and other relationships between …rms and …nancial intermediaries. In this view, credit market imperfections a¤ect the organization of the …rm. Monitoring and contract enforcement are costly, so entrepreneurs need collateral in order to obtain …nancing (Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Legros and Newman, 1996) , and they may need to rely on bank …nancing (Diamond and Rajan, 2005, Diamond, 2004) . When credit markets have greater imperfections and when a lack of …nan-cial development limits the pool of potential entrepreneurs, there should be less entry and, most likely, larger …rms in a country Zingales, 1998, Kumar, Rajan and Zingales, 1999) . Larger …rms are more likely to produce some of their own inputs or market some of their own outputs, so the …nancial view suggests that better …nancial institutions and credit markets may be associated with less vertical integration.
Third, recent work by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) and the 1 See the surveys by Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) , Joskow (2005) , and Whinston (2001) . See also the related but di¤erent approach to vertical integration in the property rights theory developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) , which points out both the bene…ts and the costs of vertical integration on incentives to undertake relationship-speci…c investments. Other important theoretical contributions in the area of vertical integration include Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) , Bolton and Whinston (1992) , Aghion and Tirole (1997) , Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) , and Legros and Newman (2003) .
World Bank (2005) stresses the importance of regulatory barriers to entry. Ease of entry is also found to be related to …rm size across countries (Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2004) . If there is less entry, presumably this makes vertically integrated …rms more likely. Consequently, the regulation view suggests a relationship between entry regulations and vertical integration.
To investigate the cross-country determinants of vertical integration and the role of speci…c institutional features emphasized by these three theories, we use a new dataset of over 750,000 …rms from 93 countries. Our methodology follows the …nance literature in taking the United States as a benchmark (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) , and we combine our …rm-level data with the U.S. input-output tables (which is assumed to accurately describe the technological possibilities in other parts of the world). While there are some limitations to our data, it nonetheless provides a new opportunity to understand how the organization of production di¤ers across countries. We have three sets of results.
First, we …nd cross-country correlations between measures of speci…c institutions emphasized by the theories and vertical integration. In particular, there is more vertical integration in countries with greater contracting costs between …rms, as measured by indices of contract enforcement costs. Vertical integration is also higher in countries with less credit or greater credit market imperfections, as indicated by a lower level of credit market development (although this result is stronger in …rm-level data than in country-level data). Finally, vertical integration is also higher in countries with greater barriers to entry, as measured by indices of the regulation of entry.
Second, however, we …nd that these cross-country di¤erences in vertical integration are almost entirely accounted for by di¤erences in industrial composition across countries. Once we control for di¤erences in industrial composition, contracting costs, credit market development, and entry regulation have little explanatory power for di¤erences in vertical integration.
Thus, it is not the case that countries with greater contracting costs, credit market imperfections, or entry regulations tend to be more vertically integrated in a given sector. Rather, such countries tend to be concentrated in sectors that are naturally vertically integrated wherever they are in the world. We document that this lack of a relationship between these speci…c institutional features and vertical integration is highly robust.
To further explore this phenomenon, we create an index of the "vertical integration propensity" of each country based on its industrial composition and the natural tendency of each industry to vertically integrate (proxied by the vertical integration of that industry in the United States). Contracting costs, …nancial development, and entry regulation are all signi…cantly correlated with a country's vertical integration propensity, and this di¤erence in industrial composition explains the correlation between these measures and vertical integration in regressions that do not control for industrial composition. However, because countries with higher contracting costs, weaker …nancial development, and greater entry regulation are also typically poorer, it is again not possible to conclude that these speci…c institutional features are the cause of di¤erences in vertical integration propensity. In fact, when we control for log GDP per capita, our speci…c measures of institutions lose signi…cance; log GDP per capita is a more robust predictor of the vertical integration index and of a country's vertical integration propensity. 2 Overall, we conclude from this set of results that measures of contracting costs, …nancial development and regulation have limited explanatory power for the level of vertical integration in a country. These results therefore shed some doubt on the importance of these speci…c institutional factors in accounting for cross-country patterns of vertical integration.
Nevertheless, our third set of results suggest that di¤erences in …nancial development (and …nancial institutions) across countries have an important e¤ect on vertical integration in the more human capital and technology-intensive sectors. We document this by looking at the e¤ect of the interaction between …nancial development and industry characteristics (in particular, physical capital, human capital and technology intensity) on vertical integration.
We …nd that even after controlling for industrial composition and for per capita GDP, greater credit market development is associated with less vertical integration in industries that are human capital and technology intensive. This suggests that a lack of …nancial development may be preventing e¢ cient organization of production in relatively high-tech and high human capital industries, though we are not able to rule out other potential explanations for this di¤erential e¤ect. In any case, it has to be emphasized that even these interaction results cannot be interpreted as causal relationships, and it may be some other (omitted) characteristics that lead to the relationship between vertical integration and the interaction of industry characteristics and …nancial development.
Our paper relates to the existing literature in a number of ways. The comparative …-nance literature …nds that countries with less …nancial development will tend not to develop in industries requiring greater external …nance (Rajan and Zingales 1998), but has not investigated cross-country di¤erences in vertical integration or in the internal organization of …rms. 3 2 The e¤ect of GDP per capita may capture the relationship between sectoral composition and the stage of development, or the e¤ect of some "broader" institutional features related to the enforcement of property rights, state-society relations or political stability (e.g., Robinson, 2001, 2002) . 3 There is a large literature on vertical integration in speci…c industries in the United States, including Joskow's (1987) seminal paper on ownership arrangements in electricity generating plants, Stuckey's (1983) study of integration between aluminium re…neries and bauxite mines, Monteverde and Teece's (1982) investigation of integration in the automobile industry, Masten's (1984) work on the aerospace industry, Ohanian's (1994) work on the pulp and paper industry, Klein's (1988) work on the Fisher Body and General Motors relationship, Hubbard's (2001, 2003) study of the trucking industry, Lerner and Merges' (1998) work on the biotech sector, and Chipty's (2001) paper on market foreclosure in the cable television industry. Woodru¤'s (2002) work on the Mexican footwear industry is the only paper we are aware of that provide a systematic study of vertical integration in a developing economy. Finally, Antràs (2003) studies the relationship between capital intensity and outsourcing using 23 U.S. industries. Also related to our paper are cross-country comparative studies, including Bain (1966) , Pryor (1972) , Scherer (1973) , Nugent and Nabli (1992) Rajan (2003) . 4 These papers typically focus on concentration, …rm size, and entry. Earlier papers use OECD data, while more recent papers use data from the Amadeus database for Western and Eastern Europe, or from the Worldscope database, which contains information only for relatively large publicly traded …rms. Our dataset is, to the best of our knowledge, unique in allowing us to look at a relatively broad cross-section of countries and a large sample of …rms, including both private and public companies and medium-size as well as large …rms. In addition, none of these studies focuses on the internal organization of the …rm or vertical integration.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data used for the study. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our …rm-level data come from WorldBase. This database, compiled by Dun & Bradstreet for the primary purpose of providing business contacts, contains information on millions of public and private …rms around the world. For each …rm, WorldBase reports the 4-digit SIC code of the primary industry in which the …rm operates, and the SIC codes of up to …ve secondary industries, listed in descending order of importance. 5 WorldBase includes data for 213 di¤erent countries. We exclude 19 of these because they are not de…ned as countries in the World Bank on-line World Development Indicators database. 6 In addition, because not all of the countries in WorldBase include reporting of secondary industries, our analysis is restricted to 93 countries for which this information is available. 4 Another well-known approach, the market foreclosure theory, views vertical integration as a method of increasing monopoly power by downstream …rms (e.g., Perry, 1978 , Aghion and Bolton, 1987 , Hart and Tirole, 1990 , Ordover, Salop, and Saloner, 1990 , and Chipty, 2001 ). We show that our results are robust to controlling for measures of antitrust regulations (as in Dutz and Hayri, 1999) . However, because the available data on cross-country di¤erences in antitrust regulation are more limited, we do not focus on antitrust issues in this paper. 5 In the entire sample, approximately 64% of …rms report one SIC code, 24% report two codes, 8% report three codes, 2% report four codes, 1% report …ve codes, and less than 1% report six codes. Note that we do not have the breakdown of sales by SIC for …rms active in multiple industries. 6 This excludes 15 non-independent territories, three independent countries below the World Bank size threshold, and one disputed territory. Taiwan is retained despite not being in the World Bank database.
Our sample consists of all …rms in these countries in the September 2002 WorldBase …le, with a maximum of 30,000 per country (a limit imposed due to cost constraints). For those countries with more than 30,000 …rms, the 30,000 largest are selected, ranked by annual sales.
We include …rms from all industries, except those operating only in "wholesale trade" and "retail trade" (we explain this omission below). After these adjustments to the data, we have a base sample of 769,199 …rms in 93 countries.
We use the benchmark input-output accounts published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to calculate the degree of vertical integration for each …rm in our sample (see Lawson, 1997 , for a discussion of the accounts). Our methodology follows the approach of Fan and Lang (2000) . 7 The input-output accounts report the dollar value of each input used to produce the output of 498 di¤erent industries in the U.S. economy. We use the 1992 input-output accounts because these are the most recently published at the 6-digit inputoutput (IO) code level. Input-output tables from the U.S. should be informative about input ‡ows across industries, to the extent these are determined by technology. For example, in all countries, car makers need to obtain tires, steel, and plastic from plants specialized in the manufacture of those goods. 8 We begin by matching the 4-digit SIC codes from each …rm in our sample with the appropriate 6-digit IO code, using the BEA's concordance guide (see Lawson, 1997) . Following Fan and Lang (2000), we exclude IO code 69.01 and 69.02 (wholesale and retail trade) from our analysis because the input-output classi…cation system does not de…ne these categories …nely enough to allow meaningful vertical integration calculations -almost all 4-digit SIC codes between 5000 and 5999 map into just these two IO codes.
For every pair of industries, IO i and IO j , the input-output accounts allow us to calculate the dollar value of IO i required to produce a dollar's worth of IO j in the United States. This amount, which we call the vertical integration coe¢ cient, VI ij , represents the opportunity for vertical integration between IO i and IO j , i.e., when it is higher, there is more use of input i in the production of output j.
Using the full set of vertical integration coe¢ cients (i.e., VI ij for every IO i and IO j ), we calculate a vertical integration index for each …rm in our dataset. The index is denoted by v cif for …rm f in industry i in country c, and is de…ned as
7 See also Acemoglu, Aghion, Gri¢ th and Zilibotti (2004) for an application of a similar methodology on UK data. 8 The use of the same input-output table across countries is justi…ed when all countries share the same technology frontier and when either all production functions are Leontief or there is factor price equalization. However, even when these stringent assumptions are not satis…ed, we expect there to be a correlation in the input use patterns across countries.
where N f is the set of industries in which …rm f is active and jN f j denotes the number of these industries. In words, we …rst sum the VI ij coe¢ cients between the …rm's primary industry and all industries in which the …rm operates. This sum represents the dollar value of inputs from industries in which the …rm operates that is required to produce one dollar's worth of the …rm's primary output. We then create a similar index v cif for secondary industries in which a …rm operates. The vertical integration index is then the average of these sums for each …rm, and as such represents the average opportunity for vertical integration in all lines of a business in which the …rm is active. 9 Across all 769,199 …rms in our dataset, this index ranges from 0 (i.e., no vertical integration) to 53.5 (i.e., an average of 53.5 cents worth of the inputs required to produce one dollar's worth of output are produced by industries in which the …rm operates).
For an example of how the vertical integration index is created, consider a Japanese auto maker in our data (primary code 59.0301) which also has two secondary sectors in the WorldBase data: automotive stampings (41.0201) and miscellaneous plastic products (32.0400). The VI ij coe¢ cients between these industries are as shown in the following (Notice that industries have VI ij coe¢ cients with themselves; for example, miscellaneous plastic products are required to produce miscellaneous plastic products.) The bottom row shows the sum of the VI ij for each industry, for example, 12.3 cents worth of the inputs required to make autos can be produced within this …rm. The vertical integration index for this …rm, v cif , is then the average of the sums in the bottom row. 10 We construct a country-level vertical integration index, denoted by v c , by averaging all v cif in the country. 11 In regressions using the country-level indices we weight the regression by the number of …rms included in the average for each index (an approach analogous to performing …rm-level regressions). In addition, we look directly at …rm-level regressions. The …rst two 9 We also conducted extensive robustness checks using only the primary (SIC) industry of each …rm. The results are essentially unchanged.
1 0 The index could also be constructed putting greater weight on the more important industries. While it seems natural to emphasize the primary industries in the index, WorldBase does not report sales breakdowns by industry, so the weightings would be somewhat arbitrary. We have constructed the index using di¤erent weighting schemes and …nd little di¤erence in the results. 1 (2004) and are constructed using the methodology in Djankov et al (2002) . In Row 11 we report an alternative measure of entry barriers -the number of procedures needed for entry.
In robustness checks, we use other measures of contracting costs, credit market development, and entry barriers, with very similar results (see Appendix Table A3 ). Appendix Table   A1 reports correlation coe¢ cients of the country-level variables. The other rows of Panel A in Table 1 report summary statistics on the vertical integration propensity by country (Row 3, discussed in Section 4), and the number of employees per …rm (Row 12). Panel B reports characteristics of relevant industries from U.S. data (discussed in Section 5).
3 Determinants of Vertical Integration
Country-level Results
According to theories emphasizing the role of contracting institutions in the internal organization of the …rm, such as Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 , we should see a negative correlation between vertical integration and the quality of contracting institutions. Theories built on credit market constraints would suggest a negative association between vertical integration and credit market development. Finally, models of entry posit a relationship between vertical integration and entry barriers. Consequently, we would expect these variables to be correlated with cross-country di¤erences in vertical integration. We investigate this question in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 uses aggregate data, while Table 3 uses …rm-level data. Table 2 shows the relationship between aggregate indices of vertical integration and our speci…c measures of institutions. The following simple model is estimated by OLS:
where v c is our index of aggregate vertical integration for country c calculated as described in the previous section, x c is a vector of country-level variables including the speci…c measures of institutions, and " c is an error term capturing all omitted factors. We do not interpret equation (1) as capturing a causal relationship, but as a convenient way of describing the correlation between speci…c measures of institutions and vertical integration around the world.
Columns 1 through 3 of Table 2 present results for our measures of contracting costs.
Column 1 uses the cost of enforcing a contract. This variable is positive, with a coe¢ cient of 1.72 and a standard error of 0.53. When contracting costs are higher, there is more vertical integration, as predicted by TCE. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1 , Panel A, which shows graphically the positive relationship between contracting costs and vertical integration.
In Column 2 of Table 2 we add log population to control for country size, and the coe¢ cient on contract enforcement cost decreases in magnitude, but remains signi…cant. Column 3 uses the number of procedures needed to enforce a contract. The results are similar to those in Column 1 -the coe¢ cient on contract enforcement procedures is positive and signi…cant, as would be predicted by TCE. A one standard deviation reduction in the cost of enforcing contracts is associated with between 1/4 and 1/2 a standard deviation fall in the country-level vertical integration propensity, which is a large e¤ect.
Columns 4 through 6 present results for our measures of credit market development.
Columns 4 and 5 show that the coe¢ cient on credit market development is negative, which suggests that stronger …nancial development is associated with less vertical integration. Nevertheless, the coe¢ cient is not signi…cant. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1 , Panel B, which shows a weak negative relationship between credit market development and vertical integration. Column 6 of Table 2 shows that the coe¢ cient on cost to create collateral is neither signi…cant nor of the expected sign. In the country-level regressions, there appears to be little evidence that credit market development is related to vertical integration. cally. Column 8 show that this relationship holds when we control for log population, and Column 9 shows that the relationship holds with our second measure of entry regulation, the number of procedures required for entry.
Firm-level Results
In Table 3 we repeat the regressions of Table 2 using …rm-level data.
A potential concern with the results in this paper is sample selection. Our dataset contains di¤erent numbers of …rms from di¤erent countries, and this variation in the selection of samples of …rms could be a source of variation in vertical integration. The main source of the problem would be potential correlation between vertical integration and …rm size (combined with di¤erential selection on …rm size across countries). For example, it could be that relatively larger companies are more vertically integrated and from countries with weaker institutional environments we only observe relatively larger companies. We can partially deal with this sample selection problem by estimating our main equation at the …rm level, and controlling for …rm size. In other words, the estimating equation now becomes
where v cf is vertical integration in …rm f in country c, x c is the set of country-level covariates as before, and z f is a set of …rm-level covariates. Because the variables of interest, our speci…c measures of institutions, vary only at the country level, whenever we report regressions of this sort, the standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. Table 3 reports the results from the estimation of (2) (with the log of the number of employees included as a measure of …rm size). 13 The general pattern is the same as in the country-level regressions in Table 2 . On the whole, the results are somewhat stronger and more precise.
Columns 1 through 3 again show that our measures of contracting costs are positively correlated with vertical integration, as would be predicted by TCE. The magnitude and signi…cance of the coe¢ cients is greater that the comparable estimates in Table 2 in all three columns. However, the standard deviation of the …rm-level vertical integration index is much larger than the standard deviation of the country-level vertical integration index, so the implied e¤ect of contracting costs on vertical integration is smaller (about 1/4 of the size in Table 2 ). 
Industrial Composition
The results in Tables 2 and 3 documented the cross-country correlation between speci…c measures of institutions and the aggregate level of vertical integration. However, a missing element in our analysis thus far has been the lack of a control for di¤erences in industrial composition across countries. It could be, for example, that countries with weaker institutional environments have economic activity concentrated in sectors that naturally have greater vertical integration. The simplest strategy to investigate whether industrial composition is an important concern is to include a full set of industry dummies in the …rm-level regressions.
Consequently, the estimating equation becomes:
where v cif is vertical integration of …rm f in industry i of country c, x c and z f are countrylevel and …rm-level covariates as before, and most importantly, the i 's are a full set of industry dummies. The presence of the dummies enables the model to capture cross-industry di¤erences in the technological or other determinants of vertical integration. The industry dummies are de…ned at the two-digit IO level, which results in a set of 76 dummy variables. 15 As with the estimates of equation (2), we cluster the standard errors at the country level to take account of the fact that the key explanatory variables do not vary by …rm (or industry).
The inclusion of a full set of industry dummies implies that in equation (3), all crosscountry comparisons are relative to the "mean propensity to integrate" in a particular industry. In other words, this regression looks at, for example, whether …rms in a country with worse contracting institutions are more of vertically integrated relative to …rms in a country with better contracting institutions in the same industry. Table 4 reports the results from the estimation of equation (3) with the full set of industry dummies included. The striking result is that there is no longer a signi…cant relationship between any of the measures of speci…c institutions and vertical integration; the exception is the cost of creating collateral, but this has the "wrong" sign. Evidently, the correlation between speci…c institutional factors and vertical integration depicted in Tables 2 and 3 was primarily due to di¤erences in the industrial composition of production across countries.
As a result, there is no evidence that, within a given industry, vertical integration is more prevalent in countries with greater contracting costs, weaker credit market development, or greater entry regulation.
More speci…cally, as we document in greater detail in the next section, countries with worse contracting institutions, more limited …nancial development and higher entry barriers are more concentrated in industries that have typically higher vertical integration, such as mining (ferrous and nonferrous), petroleum and gas, leather, fabrics, chemicals, apparel, and electronic components.
The lack of a correlation between our speci…c measures of institutions and vertical integration can be interpreted in di¤erent ways. One possibility is that our measures of speci…c institutions do not adequately capture cross-country di¤erences in these factors. Naturally, the various proxies for contracting institutions, …nancial development, and regulation policy are imperfect and potentially measured with error. Nevertheless, in addition to the results of Tables 2 and 3 , previous work shows that these indices do have signi…cant information content, and are correlated with economic outcomes (see, e.g., Djankov et al, 2002 Djankov et al, , 2003 .
Thus the lack of correlation between these measures and vertical integration is unlikely to be driven entirely by measurement error.
A second interpretation is that, even if these institutional factors do not a¤ect the degree to which a given …rm chooses to vertically integrate, they have an impact on economic outcomes across countries by in ‡uencing industrial composition. We investigate this possibility in the next section.
The …nal possibility is simply that these speci…c institutions have no impact on average vertical integration across countries. Such an interpretation would be a challenge to the theories discussed in the introduction, which (implicitly or explicitly) suggest that di¤erences in contracting costs, credit markets, or regulation policy should have a major e¤ect on crosscountry patterns of vertical integration. We will see in Section 5 that this interpretation needs to be quali…ed; one of these factors, …nancial development, has a signi…cant e¤ect on vertical integration in the human capital and technology-intensive industries.
Robustness Checks
Before investigating the relationship between speci…c institutions and vertical integration further, we present a series of robustness checks of our results to this point. We verify that without controls for industry, the correlation between speci…c institutions and vertical integration is robust. In addition we show that the lack of a correlation between these variables after controlling for industry is also robust with two minor exceptions.
In Table 5 we present a series of three robustness checks. In this table we alternate columns of …rm-level results without industry dummies, as in equation (2), with columns of …rm-level results with industry dummies, as in equation (3). We present each robustness check only for our …rst proxy for each of the three types of institutions.
Panel A of Table 5 reports results for manufacturing industries only. We de…ne "manufacturing" industries according to the BEA's classi…cation, which means we exclude basic industries (such as agriculture and mining), and service industries (such as lodging, repair services, legal services, and health services), as well as transportation, communications, utilities, and …nance-related industries. Columns 1 and 2 show that contracting costs remain signi…cant in this sample, but lose signi…cance once industry dummies are included. Columns 3 and 4 show that greater credit market development is associated with less vertical integration in this sample, and that the signi…cance disappears when industry dummies are included.
Columns 5 and 6 show that entry regulation remains signi…cant in this sample, but once again not when industry dummies are included.
Panel B of show that our …ndings are robust to this change. The exception is that the coe¢ cient on domestic credit to the private sector is now slightly below standard levels of signi…cance without industry dummies (Column 3).
Panel C of Table 5 presents results that include only industries that are present in 90%
of the countries in our sample. The purpose here is to assess if our results are driven by industries that only appear in a small subset of countries in the sample. Panel C shows that this is not the case. The results are similar to those presented previously -the institutional measures have strong explanatory power when industry dummies are not included, but very little explanatory power when industry dummies are included. As in Panel B, this is only weakly true for the …nancial development measure, which is now not signi…cant in Column 3.
In Table 6 we further check the robustness of our results by repeating the test using an alternative database. For this robustness check, we use the Worldscope database, which has been used extensively in the previous literature. It should be noted, however, that for the purposes of this paper, Worldscope is not as well suited to the investigation here as our primary data source, WorldBase. From WorldBase we get over 50 times the number of observations as in Worldscope, with data from roughly twice as many countries. In addition,
WorldBase includes privately held and medium-sized …rms, whereas Worldscope only includes large, publicly traded …rms.
Panel A of Table 6 reports results of regressions similar to those reported previously, but with the methodology described earlier now repeated on the Worldscope database. Panel A of Table 6 shows that the results are similar using the Worldscope database. Column 1 shows that the coe¢ cient on contracting costs is 1.82, very close to the 1.86 obtained in our baseline results. The standard error is higher than in the baseline results, perhaps because the number of countries included in the regression is fewer, so that the coe¢ cient is slightly below standard levels of signi…cance. Column 2 shows that, as in our baseline results, contracting costs have little explanatory power when industry dummies are included.
Column 3 of Panel A shows that the coe¢ cient on credit market development is -1.27, with a standard error of 0.35, which is a considerably stronger result than in our baseline results. Furthermore, in contrast to our baseline results, Column 4 shows that although the coe¢ cient on …nancial development is weakened when industry dummies are included, the coe¢ cient remains signi…cant and is one of the two exceptions to the general pattern of the signi…cant e¤ects disappearing once industry dummies are included.
Column 5 of Panel A shows that the coe¢ cient on the entry cost is 2.16, with a standard error of 0.94, which is somewhat stronger than our baseline results. Again, Column 6 shows the signi…cance of the coe¢ cient disappears when industry dummies are included.
Another concern with the results is that we have not so far incorporated information on business groups, which are important particularly in a number of Asian countries (see, for example, Khanna and Palepu, 2000) . Panel B of Table 6 investigates this issue. We adjust the Worldscope data for group a¢ liations for Asian countries using data from Claessens et al (2000) . 16 In this adjustment, we treat all …rms belonging to the same business group as a single entity, and aggregate their …rm-level data accordingly. Table   A3 shows that stronger antitrust regulation is associated with less vertical integration (with antitrust measured as in Dutz and Hayri, 1999) . In all cases, there is a correlation between vertical integration in these speci…c institutions, and this correlation disappears when we include industry dummies (i.e., when we control for industrial composition).
Vertical Integration Propensity
We Consequently, the source of variation inV c arises purely from the industrial composition of the country.
In Table 7 , we report results from regressions similar to those in equation (1) Table 7 show a strong correlation between speci…c measures of institutions and vertical integration propensity. Vertical integration propensity is signi…cantly higher in countries with high contracting costs (Columns 1 and 2), in countries with high costs to create collateral (Column 4) and in countries with high entry regulations (Columns 5 and 6).
Stronger credit market development is also associated with less vertical integration propensity, though this e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant (Column 3). In Column 7, we include all measures simultaneously. In this regression, contract enforcement costs and procedures required for entry emerge as having the most signi…cant correlations with vertical integration propensity. Figure 2 illustrates graphically the relationships reported in the regressions of Table 7 .
Panel A shows a strong positive relationship between contracting costs and vertical integration propensity, Panel B shows a negative (but not signi…cant) relationship between credit market development and vertical integration propensity, and Panel C shows a strong positive relationship between entry costs and vertical integration propensity.
The results in Panel A of Table 7 illustrate why the correlation between vertical integration and speci…c measures of institutions disappears when we control for industrial composition (industry dummies). Countries with weaker institutions, as measured by contracting costs, credit market development, and entry regulation, tend to be concentrated in industries with a high technological propensity for vertical integration. Consequently, when we do not control for industrial composition, we see sizable di¤erences in vertical integration across countries, but when we take into account of these di¤erences in industrial composition, the correlations disappear.
How should these results be interpreted? On the one hand, the relationship between the speci…c institutional features and vertical integration propensity might itself re ‡ect omitted factors. 18 On the other hand, it is plausible that this relationship could be related to the e¤ect of these speci…c institutional characteristics on the industrial composition of a country.
The evidence we present next favors the former interpretation.
Panel B of Table 7 One concern with Table 7 is that the vertical integration propensity measure,V c , constructed using industrial composition of countries based on our primary data source, which may not be as representative of the overall industrial composition as some other international datasets. To address this concern, we repeat the analysis of Table 7 , calculatingV c using industrial composition calculated from an alternative data source. Of the alternative data sources available, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) database is probably best suited to the task. While the country coverage is not as extensive as WorldBase, it is available for a large number of countries and o¤ers good coverage of industrial composition in those countries. UNIDO does not o¤er …rm-level data, but its industry-level data is su¢ cient for calculatingV c when combined with our estimates of vertical integration coe¢ cients,^ i 's, from our WorldBase dataset.
Accordingly, we calculate the vertical integration propensity,V c , as de…ned above, but with industrial composition of countries, S ci =S c , calculated from the UNIDO database. Table   8 reports results of regressions using this measure ofV c . Panel A shows results without log 1 8 Potentially important among these omitted factors are broad institutional characteristics, related to property rights enforcement, corruption, state-society relations and political stability, as well as any e¤ect on the stage of economic development on industrial composition. Appendix Table A1 shows that the correlation of per capita GDP with the speci…c institutional measures is generally high, suggesting that such omitted e¤ects could be important. 1 9 These results are not inconsistent with a view in which these speci…c measures of institutions indirectly a¤ect vertical integration propensity through their e¤ect on per capita GDP. Nevertheless, since many other factors a¤ect GDP per capita, we do not …nd this view compelling.
GDP per capita. The results are generally similar to those in Panel A of Table 7 . All our measures of speci…c institutions have coe¢ cients of the same sign as in Table 7 . All but two of the coe¢ cients that were signi…cant in Table 7 are signi…cant in Table 8 , a di¤erence that may be attributable to the smaller number of countries included in the regressions in Table   8 . Panel B of Table 8 shows that, again, per capita GDP dominates the speci…c measures of institutions in explaining vertical integration propensity. Though not always signi…cant in this sample of countries, per capita GDP shows a strong negative correlation with a country's vertical integration propensity.
We further investigate the relationship between log GDP per capita and vertical integration in Table 9 . Because, as Tables 7 and 8 show, per capita GDP has a strong correlation with vertical integration propensity, we would expect that per capita GDP would also be correlated with the vertical integration index. In Panel A of Table 9 we estimate …rm-level regressions without industry dummies as in equation (2), and in Panel B we estimate regressions with industry dummies as in equation (3) Table 9 shows that even this relationship does not hold when we control for industrial composition. In Panel B, the coe¢ cient on log GDP per capita is now positive and generally not signi…cant. Evidently, the entire correlation between GDP per capita and vertical integration is also due to industrial composition (or due to the relationship between GDP per capita and the vertical integration propensity, documented above).
Overall, we conclude that there is no evidence that any of the speci…c institutional features we have focused on or per capita income are systematically related to vertical integration once we take into account di¤erences in industrial composition associated with the level of economic development.
Di¤erential E¤ects Across Industries
The results in the previous sections may suggest that there are no robust regularities in cross-country vertical integration patterns once we control for industrial composition. In this section, we show that this is not entirely true by looking at the di¤erential e¤ects of these characteristics across industries.
The regression equations so far impose a "constant e¤ect" of speci…c institutional characteristics on vertical integration. Another possibility is that these characteristics have differential e¤ects across industries. For example, some industries may be systematically more vertically integrated in countries with weak institutions while other industries are more vertically integrated in countries with strong institutions. This might result, for instance, if both market transactions and contracting relationships within …rms are more imperfect in poor countries, but also avoiding market imperfections are more important for some industries (leading to more vertical integration), whereas contracting problems make vertical integration more problematic for other industries.
Speci…cations with Interaction E¤ects
Motivated by these considerations, we estimate regressions of the following form
where y c represents (log) income per capita, x c represents one of our measures of speci…c institutions, and m i represents industry-level characteristics, such as capital intensity, human capital intensity, and technology intensity. The main e¤ect for m i is already taken out by the full set of industry dummies, the i 's. The main coe¢ cient of interest in this speci…cation is , and for this reason, we also include in this equation a full set of country dummies, c . The term y c m i is included to investigate whether the interaction is between the speci…c institutional features and industry characteristics as opposed to some other factor related to income per capita (for example, a broader notion of institutional di¤erences). As with all speci…cations that include interactions, all main e¤ects are evaluated at their sample mean values. We also include …rm-level characteristics, speci…cally a measure of …rm size (as z f ).
Estimates from equation (4) are reported in Table 10 . Following the methodology in Rajan and Zingales (1998), all of the industry-level measures are based on U.S. data. In doing so we are assuming (analogous to assumptions made in Rajan and Zingales, 1998) that characteristics of industries in the U.S. economy are representative of (or at the very least correlated with) the characteristics of the same industries in other countries. Descriptive statistics for these measures are found in Panel B of Table 1 . We use three industry-level measures as interactions: physical capital intensity, human capital intensity, and the ratio of o¢ ce and computing equipment to total equipment, which we refer to as "technology intensity" throughout. We take these measures from Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), who calculate these using data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) for the year 1990. Physical capital intensity is de…ned as the log of capital investment to value added, human capital intensity is de…ned as the log of employees (full-time equivalent) to output, and as noted above, technology intensity is de…ned as the log of net capital stock in o¢ ce, computing, and accounting machinery to total net capital equipment.
We use the concordance that these authors developed to map the NIPA industries to our IO industries.
The interaction of log GDP per capita with the industry characteristic is not included in One concern is that this interaction e¤ect, like the patterns in Table 7 , may re ‡ect an interaction between industry characteristics and GDP per capita. However, the estimates in Panel B indicate that the signi…cant interaction between …nancial development and human capital intensity is robust to controlling for log GDP per capita. In fact, the coe¢ cient hardly changes when we include the interaction between GDP per capita and industry characteristics.
Columns 7 through 9 of Table 10 look at the relationship between technology intensity and vertical integration. As with human capital intensity, in Panel A, the strongest e¤ect is again on credit market development interacted with technology intensity, which has a negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient. Panel B shows that this result is robust to including log GDP per capita interacted with technology intensity. The coe¢ cient on entry cost interacted with technology intensity is also signi…cant in Panel B, but not in Panel A.
Overall, the interaction results suggest that credit market development is an important determinant of vertical integration in certain industries. More credit market development appears to reduce vertical integration in technology and human capital intensive industries.
In Table 11 we perform additional tests to assess the robustness of the relationship between vertical integration and the interaction of credit market development with human capital intensity and technology intensity. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 11 we control for …nancial development interacted with each industry's dependence on external …nance. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that …nancial development has a more pronounced e¤ect on growth in industries that are more dependent on external …nance, so part of our results might be capturing the interaction between …nancial dependence and …nancial development. To control for this, we follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and calculate each industry's technological dependence on external …nance based on U.S. data in the CRSP database. Our measure follows the exact de…nition in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and is computed from U.S. data from 1990-1999. Columns 1 and 2 show that …nancial development interacted with external dependence on …nance has very little impact on vertical integration, whereas the interactions of …nancial development with human capital intensity (Column 1) and technology intensity (Column 2) retain signi…cant explanatory power. In Columns 3 and 4, we repeat the tests using an alternative measure of …nancial dependence from Rajan and Zingales (1998), the industry's dependence on equity (calculated from the same CRSP data). Again, this does not a¤ect the signi…cance of our interactions with human capital intensity and technology intensity. The …nal columns of Table 11 repeat the robustness tests of Table 5 . These columns show that our interaction results are robust to excluding the most and least vertically integrated industries (Columns 7 and 8), and to including only industries appearing in at least 90% of the sample countries (Columns 9 and 10). Finally, the interactions continue to have the right sign but are no longer statistically signi…cant when we restrict the regression to manufacturing industries (Columns 5 and 6), which suggests that di¤erences in vertical integration in some high human capital service industries (such as electric and gas utilities, repair services, and amusements) are important for the interaction results.
Overall, the results of Tables 10 and 11 illustrate an interesting pattern relating …nancial development to vertical integration. They suggest that, when …nancial development is limited, the greatest extent of vertical integration is to be found in industries with advanced technology and greater than average human capital requirements.
Interpretation
How do we interpret the interaction e¤ects reported in Tables 10 and 11 ? At face value, they suggest that while …nancial development has little e¤ect on average vertical integration, it reduces vertical integration in technology-intensive and human capital-intensive sectors. This also naturally implies that …nancial development must have some positive e¤ect on vertical integration in less technology-intensive sectors.
To interpret this pattern, let us return to the theories related to …nancial development.
The crux of these theories is that lack of external (bank and market) …nance will prevent entry of new …rms and productive investment by existing …rms. While we may expect that this will lead to larger and thus more vertically integrated …rms, in fact the opposite might also be the case. For example, it may be e¢ cient (either technologically or because of contractual reasons) for downstream …rms to integrate with their upstream suppliers, but such a relationship may not emerge if downstream …rms are credit constrained. On the other hand, if upstream …rms are credit constrained and cannot undertake the necessary investments, vertical integration may occur even when it is not e¢ cient.
In this light, the patterns we document are consistent with a con…guration whereby in countries with limited …nancial development, low-tech sectors are insu¢ ciently integrated, while high-tech sectors are excessively integrated. To investigate this issue further, we looked for evidence that the productivity implications of vertical integration are di¤erent depending on industry characteristics. In particular, we estimated models with productivity (sales per employee) on the left hand side and the triple interaction of …nancial development, the …rm-level vertical integration index and human capital intensity and also human capital intensity squared (or technology intensity and technology intensity squared) on the right hand side. 20 If both high vertical integration in the high-tech sectors and low vertical integration in the low-tech sectors of …nancially less-developed countries is ine¢ cient, we may expect a nonmonotonic e¤ect of the triple interaction (so that vertical integration in …nancially lessdeveloped countries is associated with lower productivity speci…cally in the sector with the lowest or highest technology or human capital needs). This exercise did not show a nonmonotonic pattern (results available upon request). This may re ‡ect the fact that some other mechanism is responsible for the di¤erential e¤ects of …nancial development, or it may result from the crudeness of the productivity measures in the WorldBase dataset. Further investigation of the nature and cause of these di¤erential e¤ects is an area for future research.
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the cross-country determinants of vertical integration in a new dataset of over 750,000 …rms from 93 countries. Our focus was on the e¤ect of speci…c institutional features on the vertical integration decisions of …rms. This focus was motivated by both empirics and theory. Casual empiricism and existing work suggest that there are large di¤erences in the organization of production and …rms across countries and this may be related to contracting problems. Relatedly, a body of in ‡uential theories suggest that contracting costs (contracting institutions), credit market development and regulation should be important determinants of vertical integration.
Our empirical results do not con…rm the main predictions of these theories. Although there is a cross-country correlation between vertical integration on the one hand and contracting costs, …nancial development, and entry barriers on the other, we show that this is entirely driven by industrial composition. In particular, countries with higher contracting costs or more limited …nancial development are concentrated in industries with a high propensity for vertical integration. Once we control for di¤erences in industrial composition, none of these factors seem to a¤ect vertical integration.
Nevertheless, our results also point to a signi…cant relationship between …nancial development and vertical integration. We …nd a relatively robust di¤erential e¤ect of …nancial development across industries: countries with less-developed …nancial markets are signi…-cantly more integrated in industries that are more human capital or technology intensive.
We view our paper as a …rst step in understanding the cross-country patterns of organization of …rms. Despite the importance of the organization of production for productivity and the existence of various in ‡uential theories, we know very little about these patterns.
The dataset and the approach in this paper can be useful in investigating other dimensions of di¤erences in the organization of …rms across countries. Djankov et al. (2002 Djankov et al. ( , 2003 . Panel B presents U.S. industry characteristics used as interacation terms in Section 5. Industry characteristics come from Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998).
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Contract enforcement cost Table 2 Vertical integration and contracting institutions, credit market development, and entry regulation (country level)
Dependent variable is the vertical integration index
The table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of a country-level vertical integration index on specific measures of institutions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by the number of firms included in the calculation of the vertical integration index for each country.
Contract enforcement cost Table 3 Vertical integration and contracting institutions, credit market development, and entry regulation (firm level)
The table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of a firm-level vertical integration index on specific measures of institutions.
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within countries, are in parentheses.
Contract enforcement cost Table 4 Vertical integration and contracting institutions, credit market development, and entry regulation (firm level)
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within countries, are in parentheses. Also estimated but not reported are a set of industry dummies defined at the two-digit input-output level.
(1) The table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of a firm-level vertical integration index on specific measures of institutions. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within countries, are in parentheses. In specified columns, industry dummies, defined at the two-digit input-output level, are also estimated but not reported. In Panel B, "most and least vertically industries" includes the 5% most and 5% least vertically integrated industries. 
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Dependent variable is the vertical integration index Table 6 Robustness checks with Worldscope data (firm level)
The table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of a firm-level vertical integration index on specific measures of institutions. Data come from the Worldscope database. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within countries, are in parentheses. In specified columns, industry dummies, defined at the two-digit input-output level, are also estimated but not reported. In Panel B, "Groupadjusted" means that Asian firms belonging to the same business group are treated as a single entity.
(1) Table 7 Vertical integration propensity (country level)
Dependent variable is vertical integration propensity
The table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of an index measuring a country's propensity for vertical integration on specific measures of institutions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by the number of firms per country.
(1) Table 8 Robustness check of vertical integration propensity with UNIDO data (country level)
The table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of an index measuring a country's propensity for vertical integration on specific measures of institutions. The propensity for vertical integration is calculated using data from the UNIDO database. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by the number of firms per country.
(1) Table 9 Vertical integration and GDP per capita (firm level)
The table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of a firm-level vertical integration index on specific measures of institutions. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within countries, are in parentheses. Also estimated in Panel B, but not reported, are a set of industry dummies defined at the two-digit input-output level. The table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of a firm-level vertical integration index on specific measures of institutions interacted with U.S. industry characteristics. Industry characteristics are taken from Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998). Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within country/industries, are in parentheses. Also estimated but not reported are a set of industry dummies defined at the two-digit input-output level, and a set of country dummies.
Dependent variable is the vertical integration index
(1)(2)
Human capital intensity
Technology intensity Table 10 Interactions of industry characteristics with contracting institutions, credit market development, and entry regulation (firm level) The table presents coefficient estimates from regressions of a firm-level vertical integration index on credit market development interacted with U.S. industry characteristics. Human capital intensity and technology intensity come from Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998). External dependence and equity dependence are defined as in Rajan and Zingales (1998) . "Most and least vertically industries" includes the 5% most and 5% least vertically integrated industries. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within country/industries, are in parentheses. Also estimated but not reported are a set of industry dummies defined at the two-digit input-output level, and a set of country dummies. Table 11 Credit market development interaction results, additional robustness checks
Capital intensity Dependent variable is the vertical integration index
Dependent variable is the vertical integration index
Control for external dependence The table reports estimated dummy variables in a firm-level regression of vertical integration on industry dummies using U.S. data. 
